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THE EMPLOYER'S DUTY TO SUPPLY
INFORMATION TO THE UNION-A STUDY OF
THE INTERPLAY OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND
JUDICIAL RATIONALIZATION
Florian Bartosic and Roger C. Hartleyf
The imposition of an affirmative obligation on an employer to
provide his employees' exclusive bargaining representative with various
kinds of information has been one of the most significant developments
in the evolution of the concept of good faith bargaining under section
8(a)(5) of the Labor Management Relations Act.1 This development
has been in part a response to the realization that certain information
acts as the lubricant needed to keep the collective bargaining machinery
running smoothly. It recognizes that the parties can negotiate and ad-
minister a collective bargaining agreement only when they have avail-
able the information necessary to make informed, intelligent decisions.
The employer's obligation to provide information to the em-
ployees' bargaining representative has evolved from contributions by
both the National Labor Relations Board and the judiciary. In the
early stages of this evolution, attempts were made to classify types of
requests for information. A dichotomy arose between requests for em-
ployee wage data, which were presumptively relevant to the bargaining
process, and requests for other types of information. As the law in this
area developed, the Board demonstrated a growing propensity to accord
the presumption of relevance to data other than employee wages. More
recently, a "substantiation doctrine" has been utilized to require the
employer to furnish data, and the type of data requested has become
t Professor of Law, Wayne State University. B.A. 1948, Pontifical College; B.C.L. 1956,
College of William and Mary; LL.M. 1957, Yale University.
j- Lecturer in Labor Law, Catholic University Law School; Attorney, Office of the
General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board. B.S. 1965, Cornell University; J.D.
1970, University of Pittsburgh.
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as "the Act"].
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his em-
ployees .... " 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
Section 8(d) of the Act provides in part:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agree-
ment, or any question arising thereunder ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
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less significant. This article will examine this evolutionary progression
and will discuss whether the Board and the courts in the "substantia-
tion" cases have adopted a rationale which is significantly different
from that of the traditional "information" cases, and whether the Board
and the courts have been consistent in their application of the substan-
tiation doctrine vis-a-vis various types of information in diverse factual
contexts.
I
PROVING THE "NEcEssrrY" OF REQuESTED INFORMATION
From the beginning, the Board and the courts have held that an
employer has a general obligation to provide information needed by
his employees' bargaining representative for the proper performance
of its duties.2 Such a rule, of course, entailed an explication of the bur-
den the union had to meet to establish that it needed information to
perform properly its duties as bargaining representative.
A. Development of the Presumptive Relevance Rule
In Aluminum Ore Co.,8 the Board stated the classic test of rele-
vance: the union must demonstrate that the requested information is
necessary for it to bargain intelligently over specific issues raised during
the course of negotiations. From this somewhat restrictive criterion the
Board and the courts together developed modifications that broadened
the union's right to information. The most important of these have
formed the basis for the presumptive relevance test for in-unit wage
data.
In Yawman & Erbe Manufacturing Co.,4 the Board ordered the
employer to furnish the union with certain wage data concerning merit
incredses for unit employees, on the theory that the union might find
it necessary or desirable to make demands for changes in existing merit
systems should evidence of inequities emerge upon review of the data.
Although the Board, consistent with the premise of Aluminum Ore,
continued to formulate the rule in terms of the union's need for the
2 See, e.g., Aluminum Ore Co., 39 N.L.R.B. 1286, enforced, 131 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1942)
(job classification list, names of employees, nature of jobs, wage rate, and payroll in-
formation); Sherwin-Williams Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 651 (1941), enforced, 130 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.
1942) (job rates for other paint manufacturers in vicinity); Pioneer Pearl Button Co., 1
N.L.R.B. 837 (1936) (proof of contention that employer's poor financial condition prevented
wage increase or hour decrease).
8 89 N.L.R.B. 1286, enforced, 131 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1942).
4 89 N.L.R.B. 881 (1950), enforced, 187 F.2d 947 (2d Cir. 1951).
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requested information with respect to specific bargaining issues, it in-
dicated its willingness to allow the union to base its demand upon the
potential usefulness such information might have in framing bargain-
ing demands.5
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit enforced the Board's
Yawman & Erbe order in a per curiam decision6 which served as a
springboard for the Board's subsequent adoption of a presumptive
relevance test for in-unit wage information. In its opinion the Second
Circuit held that the requested information was relevant and went on
to observe:
Indeed, we find it difficult to conceive a case in which current or
immediately past wage rates would not be relevant during nego-
tiations for a minimum wage scale or for increased wages.
Since the employer has an affirmative statutory duty to supply
relevant wage data, his refusal to do so is not justified by the
Union's failure initially to show the relevance of the requested
information. The rule governing the disclosure of data of this
kind is not unlike that prevailing in discovery procedures under
modern codes. There the information must be disclosed unless it
plainly appears irrelevant. Any less lenient rule in labor disputes
would greatly hamper the bargaining process, for it is virtually im-
possible to tell in advance whether the requested data will be rele-
vant except in those infrequent instances in which the inquiry is
patently outside the bargaining issue.7
In 1954, the Board formally departed from the Aluminum Ore
standard which required a showing of actual or at least prospective
need for wage information in relation to a specific subject of bargain-
ing. Whitin Machine Works8 presented the Board with a situation
in which the charging union requested a list of employee names
together with each employee's wage rate. The request was based upon
the need to compare unit employee wages to area standards, but the
information was useful for collective bargaining purposes generally.
Rejecting the employer's argument that the union did not need the
5 Without such information, there is no basis for determining to what extent,
if any, the minimum wage would affect any employees in the unit. Further, the
information requested for 1948 would enable the Union to ascertain if any wage
inequities existed among employees in the unit and to frame its contract demands
so as to eliminate any possible discrepancies. In sum, the Respondent's refusal to
divulge information as to the current salaries of the employees in the unit placed
the Union in the position of dealing in vacuo on subjects relating to wages, as
there existed no area known to the Union in which it could vary its wage position.
89 N.L.R.B. at 882 (footnote omitted).
6 NLRB v. Yawman & Erbe Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 947 (2d Cir. 1951).
7 Id. at 949 (footnotes omitted).




wage rates collated as to individual employees to compare the wage
rates to area standards, the Board adopted the presumptive relevance
rule suggested by the Second Circuit in Yawman & Erbe without
specifically mentioning that opinion. 9 Two days later, however, the
Board issued a "short form" decision in Item Co.,10 adopting the trial
examiner's report which had applied the presumptive relevance test
for in-unit wage information in reliance upon the Yawman & Erbe
reasoning that this type of information must be supplied unless plainly
irrelevant."
Finally, citing the court's opinion in Yawman & Erbe and its own
Whitin Machine Works decision along with Chairman Farmer's con-
currence in that case,'2 the Board unequivocally adopted the pre-
sumptive relevance test in Boston Herald-Traveler Corp.'3 The pre-
sumption was to attach even in circumstances where the employer
could show that the subject to which the information pertained had
not actually been discussed during negotiations.'
Although the presumptive relevance test was developed in in-unit
wage information cases arising during contract negotiations, it has
been applied to a wide variety of wage information requests designed
to enable the union to administer the collective bargaining agreement.
In Acme Industrial Co.,15 the employer refused to supply the union
with requested information pertaining to pending grievances involving
a subcontracting clause, asserting that because the contract had not
been violated it was under no duty to supply the information. The
Board found that the information was necessary to enable the union to
evaluate intelligently the grievance filed, and accordingly ordered that
9 In ordering the employer to make the wage information available, the Board con-
cluded: "[i]t is sufficient that the information sought by the Union is related to the issues
involved in collective bargaining, and ... no specific need as to a particular issue must
be shown." 108 N.L.R.B. at 1539. Chairman Farmer, concurring, would have gone further
than the other Board members:
I would not require that the union show the precise relevancy of the re-
quested information to particular current bargaining issues. It is enough for me
that the information relate to the wages or fringe benefits of the employees. Such
information is obviously related to the bargaining process, and the union is there-
fore entitled to ask and receive it.
Id. at 1541 (concurring opinion).
10 108 N.L.R.B. 1634 (1954), enforced, 220 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1955).
11 89 N.L.R.B. at 882.
12 See note 9 supra.
's 110 N.L.R.B. 2097 (1954), enforced, 223 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1955).
14 110 N.L.R.B. at 2099. As succinctly stated by the Board in Pine Indus. Relations
Comm., Inc., 118 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1060 (1957): "[m]a wage data cases it is sufficient that the in-
formation sought by the union is relevant and no specific need as to a particular issue must
be shown."
15 150 N.L.R.B. 1463, enforcement denied, 351 F.2d 258 (7th Cir. 1965), rev'd, 385 US.
432 (1967).
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the information be supplied.' The Seventh Circuit declined to enforce
the Board's order,'7 holding that the provision for binding arbitration
of contract disputes foreclosed the Board from exercising its statutory
power to order the company to supply the requested information.18
Reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court concluded that the
Board may determine the need for requested information without
awaiting the arbitrator's decision.' 9 The Court reasoned that the Board's
action would strengthen, rather than jeopardize, the arbitral process by
affording the union the opportunity to evaluate the merits of the
grievance, and thus make an informed decision on whether to proceed
to arbitration. 20 Of particular importance is the fact that the Supreme
16 150 N.LR..B. at 1466-67.
17 Acme Indus. Co. v. NLRB, 351 F.2d 258 (7th Cir. 1965).
18 The court reasoned:
The latter [the application of contract provisions] is a matter exclusively reserved
for the arbitrator. Under the circumstances here presented Board intervention to
make the determination of relevancy in the light of its independent interpretation
of the meaning and application of the contract provisions contravenes the policy
expressed in United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574 [1960]. ... concerning the priority which should be accorded the griev-
ance and arbitration procedures and machinery provided for in the contract.
Id. at 260-61.
19 NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 438-39 (1967).
20 Id. at 438. In Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (Aug.
20, 1971), the Board, in a three-to-two decision, held that a dispute over allegedly unlawful
unilateral changes made by the company should be resolved through the arbitration proce-
dures provided for in the contract rather than through the processes of the Board since the
matter was "essentially a dispute over the terms and meaning of the contract between the
Union and the Respondent." 77 L.R.R.M. at 1932. In an address entitled "First Questions
from Collyer," NLRB General Counsel Peter G. Nash commented:
[I]s a dispute over a union request for information relevant to the evalua-
tion and processing of grievances deferrable under Collyer? A refusal to furnish
such information may itself be an arbitrable matter under the terms of a particular
contract. But the Supreme Court's decision in the Acme Industrial case casts doubt
on the suitability of deferral in such a case. The Court characterized the Board's
assertion of jurisdiction there as "not intruding upon the province of the arbitra-
tor" but rather "in aid of the arbitral process." An employer's refusal of grievance
information might also be considered evidence of a general unwillingness to settle
disputes by arbitration. Collyer deferral may not, therefore, be appropriate in
disputes over grievance information requests except, perhaps, where the grievance
about which the information was requested is already before an arbitrator. The
union there might reasonably be required to direct its request to the arbitrator.
Nash, First Questions from Collyer, 1971 LABOR RELATIONS YEmRBOO 151, 156 (footnote
omitted). Subsequently, the General Counsel issued the following instructions to all
NLRB Regional Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers:
Disputes over a union's request for information relevant and necessary to its
evaluation and processing of grievances, even though arbitrable under the par-
ticular bargaining agreement, should not be deferred for arbitration. However, in
instances in which the underlying grievance is already before an arbitrator, the
question of deferral of the dispute over the request for information should be
submitted to Washington for advice.
Memorandum, Arbitration Deferral Policy Under Collyer, Feb. 28, 1972, at 8 (footnote
1972]
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Court established that there is no question that the general obligation
of the employer to provide the bargaining representative with all rele-
vant information needed for the proper performance of its duties ex-
tends beyond contract negotiations into the life of the contract.
Since Acme was not a wage data case, the Supreme Court's holding
can only be said to approve the general rule that an employer has an
obligation to provide necessary information in contract administration
cases when necessity is specifically established. The Board, however, has
adopted the presumptive relevance test regarding requests for in-unit
wage data in contract administration situations.2 1 The Board has cited
many instances of wage information requests which have a "direct bear-
ing" on the bargaining representative's ability to administer the con-
tract and are thus considered presumptively relevant. Among the types
of wage information having such a "direct bearing" on bargaining are
(1) individual earnings,22 (2) job rates and classifications, 23 (3) merit in-
creases,2-4 (4) pension data, 2 5 (5) incentive earnings, 26 (6) piece rates,2 7
and (7) the operation of an incentive system.28
Thus the Board and the courts have fashioned from the broad
language of section 8(a)(5) of the Act a rule that establishes an affir-
mative obligation on the employer to provide necessary and relevant in-
formation to the union both during the negotiation of the contract and
omitted) (on file at the Cornell Law Review). The footnote to the first quoted sentence
reads:
The Court's decision in N.L.R.B. v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 [1967],
. . . was believed to weigh against deferral for arbitration in disputes over a
union's request for grievance information.
An employer's denial to a union of information relevant to grievance process-
ing might also be viewed as precluding the "quick and fair means" the Board
referred to [in Collyer, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1934] for resolving disputes and as evidenc-
ing a purpose on the part of an employer to obstruct the efficient working of the
arbitral process.
Id. n.15.
21 In 1967, the year of the Supreme Court's Acme decision, the Board observed:
Both the Board and the courts have found violations of Section 8(a)(5) in un-
satisfied requests for information which has a direct bearing on the negotiation
of wages and fringe benefits or the bargaining representative's ability to adminis-
ter the agreement. Such information is "presumptively relevant" to the perfor-
mance of the Union's functions.
Standard Oil Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 343, 345 (1967) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
22 See Timken Roller Bearing Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 15 (1962), enforced, 325 F.2d 746 (6th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 971 (1964).
23 See Taylor Forge & Pipe Works v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1956).
24 See NLRB v. J.H. Allison & Co., 165 F.2d 766 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814
(1948).
25 See Phelps Dodge Copper Prods. Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 360 (1952).
26 See Dixie Mfg. Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 645 (1948), enforced, 180 F.2d 173 (6th Cir. 1950).
27 See Vanette Hosiery Mills, 80 N.L.R.B. 1116 (1948), enforced sub nom. NLRB v.
Itasca Cotton Mfg. Co., 179 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1950).
28 See Dixie Mfg. Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 645 (1948), enforced, 180 F.2d 173 (6th Cir. 1950).
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during its administration. 29 Regarding in-unit employee wage data, a
presumption of relevance has been established; the union is not re-
quired to establish a specific need for the requested wage data. With
respect to information other than employee wage data, the union must
demonstrate that the information is necessary to enable it to bargain
intelligently concerning a particular bargaining issue.80
29 Several defenses to union demands for information have been successfully main-
tained. The first was established in Cincinnati Steel Castings Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 592, 593
(1949); an employer need not supply information in the exact form requested if he supplies
it in a manner "not so burdensome or time-consuming as to impede the process of bar-
gaining." See, e.g., Tex-Tan, Inc., 134 N.L.R.B. 253 (1961), enforcement denied in part, 318
F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1963) (refusal to furnish complex and voluminous time study record in
organized fashion held acceptable); J.I. Case Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 520 (1957), enforced, 263
F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1958) (oral presentation of complicated time study information held
unacceptable); Old Line Life Ins. Co. of America, 96 N.L.R.B. 499 (1951), enforced sub
nom. Insurance Employees Local 65 v. NLRB, 200 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1952) (offer to supply
union with verification of old list of unit employees' names and wage rates instead of cur-
rent list held acceptable). As a developing corollary, when the employer raises bona fide
objections to the form in which the data are requested, the union must state its specific
needs to enable the employer to supply the information in a mutually satisfactory form, if
possible. See American Cyanamid Co. (Marietta Plant), 129 N.L.R.B. 688 (1960) (employer
desired to keep unique manufacturing techniques confidential). See also Emeryville Re-
search Center, Shell Dev. Co. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1971). But the union has a
right to information in the form it requests if that form is necessary, i.e., "a necessarily
reliable and reasonably expeditions" device for making intelligent bargaining or grievance
processing possible. General Elec. Co., 186 N.L.R.B. No. 1, 75 LR.R.M. 1265, 1266 (Oct. 16,
1970) (videotape of operations insufficient).
Another defense-one which has not been notably successful-is that the union's re-
quest for information imposes an "unreasonable burden" on the employer. Application of
this defense requires a balancing of the interests of both parties. See General Elec. Co. v.
NLRB, 414 F.2d 918 (4th Cir. 1969); Fafnir Bearing Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1582 (1964), enforced,
862 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1966) (defense rejected in both cases). But see Food Employer Council,
Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 98, 80 L.R.R.M. 1440, 1441 (June 16, 1972) (no obligation to supply
information already furnished to union "in clear and understandable form on a reasonably
current periodic basis"). Confidentiality of the requested information is no defense, whether
the information is confidential to employees (see NLRB v. Item Co., 220 F.2d 956 (5th Cir.
1955); Aluminum Ore Co. v. NLRB, 131 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1942); Electrical Mfg. Co., 173
N.L.R.B. 878 (1968); Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 2097 (1954)), whether it
is confidential to the employer for competitive reasons (see Frontier Homes Corp., 153
N.L.R.B. 1070 (1965), enforced in relevant part, 371 F.2d 974 (8th Cir. 1967); Boston Herald-
Traveler Corp., supra), or even if the confidentiality of a nonunit third party is at stake
(see General Elec. Co., 184 N.L.R.B. No. 45, 74 L.R.R.M. 1444 (June 80, 1970), enforced,
81 L.R.R.M. 2303 (6th Cir. Sept. 15, 1972) (employer required to identify companies which
had supplied information for area wage survey)). But see Shell Oil Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d
615 (9th Cir. 1972) (refusal to disclose employee names and addresses held privileged
because of company's bona fide concern over possible harassment of nonunion employees);
United Aircraft Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 77 L.R.R.M. 1785 (July 80, 1971) (refusal
to disclose employee medical information until relevant to specific contract dispute held
privileged because of "generally recognized" confidential nature of physician's report).
80 One presently unresolved issue is the matter of the allocation of financial liability
for producing information. In his concurring opinion in Whitin Machine Works, 108
N.L.R.B. 1537, 1540 (1954), Chairman Farmer stated that the employer could require the
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B. Expansion of the Traditional Limits of Presumptive Relevance
Although the presumption of relevance was originally associated
with requests for in-unit wage data, the Board and the courts have ex-
panded the concept in two ways: (1) by broadening the definition of
"wage data," and (2) by developing a rule of presumptive relevance in
the area of employee addresses. These developments suggest the need for
an analysis of the rationale supporting the presumptive relevance doc-
trine in order to predict what its scope will be.
1. Expanding the Definition of "Wage Data"
In Sylvania Electric Products, Inc.,3 1 the union sought information
concerning a noncontributory group insurance program maintained by
the company for its employees. The union asked for information as to
levels of benefits, the scope of coverage, cost, and the amount of claims
paid. The company generally acceded to the union's request for infor-
mation, but it refused to provide information regarding current pre-
union "to enter into reasonable arrangements for the compilation of the requested data
including provisions for bearing the additional cost to the employer of furnishing the re-
quested information." Id. at 1541. As bargaining units become larger, as collective bargain-
ing concerns itself with more sophisticated issues, as the information itself becomes more
complex, and as the right to information is extended, the cost of supplying requested data
will substantially increase. The task of dividing costs between union and employer will
vary in difficulty with the circumstances of each case. Recently the Board wrestled with the
problem of reimbursement to the employer of the expense of duplicating employment
records ($50,000). The Board held: "'Good-faith bargaining requires only that such infor-
mation be made available at a reasonable time and in a reasonable place and with an
opportunity for the Union to make a copy of such information if it so desires.'" United Air-
craft Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 77 L.R.R.M. 1785, 1796 (July 20, 1971), quoting Lasko
Metal Prods., Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 976, 979 (1964). Thus the employer was not required to
pay the duplicating costs once the records were made available. In Food Employer Council,
Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 98, 80 L.R.R.M. 1440 (June 16, 1972), the Board stated:
If there are substantial costs involved in compiling the information in the precise
form and at the intervals requested by the Union, the parties must bargain in
good faith as to who shall bear such costs, and, if no agreement can be reached,
the Union is entitled in any event to access to records from which it can reasonably
compile the information. If any dispute arises in applying these guidelines, it will
be treated in the compliance stage of the proceeding.
Id. at 1441 (footnote omitted).
Whether, when a compilation of data "in clear and understandable form" (id.) is
necessary, the employer is required to "make available" the compilation for duplication
by the union or is only required to produce "raw data" to be compiled and duplicated by
the union at its expense remains an unsettled question. Perhaps the question will be
answere4, by reading United Aircraft Corp., supra, together with the rule in Cincinnati
Steel Castings Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 592 (1949), that information must be "made available in
a manner not so burdensome or time-consuming as to impede the process of bargaining."
Id. at 593. The rule would then be that the employer's duty ceases when, but only when,
data are made available in a nonburdensome form. Thus, the employer would pay (or at
least share) the cost of the compilation and the union would pay the cost of duplication.
31 127 N.L.R.B. 924 (1960), rev'd, 291 F.2d 128 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 926
(1961).
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mium rates and the amount of premiums paid during the preceding
two years. The Board, reversing the trial examiner, held that the pre-
miums paid by the company, as well as the benefits granted, constituted
wages, that the requested premium cost data were directly related to
the matter of wages, that such data were presumptively relevant to the
bargaining representative's obligations, and therefore that the em-
ployer's refusal to furnish the requested data violated the Act.32 The
Board's holding that premium costs were wages falling within the
in-unit wage information rule was a significant extension of the pre-
sumptive relevance test.
However, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected the
Board's theory and adopted instead the trial examiner's distinction be-
tween the benefits of group employee insurance-admittedly "wages"
within the meaning of the Act 33-and the cost of obtaining such bene-
fits, which was held not to be directly related to wages or conditions of
employment within any ordinarily accepted meaning of the words. 34
It is clear from the court's reasoning that it was limiting the scope of
presumptively relevant information to demands for wage data or condi-
tions of employment as ordinarily defined, and was unwilling to expand
the concept to cover matters directly related to wages or conditions of
employment. But the court did point out that there might be circum-
stances under which a union would be entitled to know the cost of a
noncontributory welfare program, for example, if the employer had
refused to accede to the union's demand for increased or broader insur-
ance coverage for employees.
35
Despite the First Circuit's refusal to enforce its order in Sylvania,
the Board continued its attempt to expand the scope of the presumptive
relevance concept. Presented with a similar issue in General Electric
Co.,36 the Board adopted the trial examiner's report, which stated:
First, [General Electric] contends that cost information as to its
pension and insurance proposals could not be legally required
because employees were not being asked to bear any part of the
cost of the new increments. That contention is rejected on the au-
thority [inter alia] of the Board's decision in Sylvania .... 87
32 127 N.L.R.B. at 925-26.
33 Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 128, 131 (Ist Cir. 1961); see W.W.
Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949) (group health and accident insurance
held "wages").
84 291 F.2d at 131.
35 Id. at 132.
36 150 N.L.R.B. 192 (1964), enforced, 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
965 (1970).
37 150 N.L.R.B. at 261. Even prior to General Electric, the Board had asserted its
adherence to its rulings in Sylvania: "[W]e respectfully disagree with the distinction
1972]
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The Board has since tempered its opposition to the First Circuit's
Sylvania holding by recourse to that court's dictum that there may be
circumstances under which premium cost information would be rele-
vant.88 It assumed this compromise position in a case involving the
same company.89 Sylvania H1 arose in circumstances similar to Sylvania I.
In the course of negotiations for a new contract, the employer offered
the union a "package" that included improvements in existing welfare
programs. Upon request, the employer furnished the union with infor-
mation relating to the cost of its current program, but refused to pro-
vide a breakdown of the cost of its proposed package, including the
welfare improvements. The union desired the requested information
to enable it to decide whether to bargain for retention of the existing
welfare plan, and on that basis to seek a higher wage rate rather than
increased benefits. The company countered that only benefit levels were
of legitimate concern to the union, not cost to the employer. The Board
argued to the First Circuit that meaningful bargaining as to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment may require a
party to disclose information on matters that do not themselves fall
within that phrase. Therefore, when the union makes a demand for
cost information to enable it better to balance the desirability of an
increase in welfare benefits against the desirability of an equivalent
increase in take home pay, the requested cost information is so neces-
sary to effective negotiation that withholding it should be deemed in-
consistent with good faith bargaining. The First Circuit enforced the
Board's order in Sylvania II based on this reasoning.40
In Sylvania 1, the Board had relied upon presumptive relevance
by arguing that both benefit levels and premium costs are wages, hence
drawn by the court of appeals between costs and benefits of a noncontributory insurance
plan... ." Electric Furnace Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1080 (1962).
88 See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
89 Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 1756 (1965), enforced, 858 F.2d 591 (1st
Cir. 1966).
40 Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 858 F.2d 591, 593 (Ist Cir. 1966). In NLRB
v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 897 U.S. 965 (1970), in
discussing Sylvania I and 11, the Second Circuit commented:
GE argues that a prior decision of the First Circuit, Sylvania Electric Products,
Inc. v. NLR.B, 291 F.2d 128 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 868 U.S. 926, 82 S. Ct. 360, 7
L. Ed. 2d 190 (1961), denied discovery of such information for a noncontributory
plan and thus demonstrated that the state of the law was, at the very least, highly
unsettled. In the first Sylvania case, however, the court was careful to indicate that
if the Company interposed a cost objection to a Union proposal-as here-the
Union might be entitled to the cost figures, citing Truitt. In any event the second
Sylvania case expressly distinguished the first almost to the point of extinction by
permitting the Union to demand cost information wherever the Union sought
to weigh the value of different posssible wage-benefit packages.
418 F.2d at 750 n.6.
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that data concerning premium costs are relevant without establishing
relevance vis4-vis any specific bargaining issue. Notwithstanding the
Board's adherence to that position in General Electric, the Board made
no mention of the presumptive relevance doctrine in Sylvania II, but
established the necessity for the requested information by tying it to a
specific union decision to be made at the bargaining table. The ra-
tionale of the Sylvania II position accords with that underlying the
presumptive relevance doctrine without requiring the literal expansion
of the definition of wages attempted in Sylvania L
A recent decision involving the question of supplying data rele-
vant to the cost of welfare benefits is Cone Mills Corp.4' During nego-
dons the union requested data on the cost of the employer's proposed
noncontributory pension plan and on the actuarial assumptions upon
which it was based. In ordering the employer to make this information
available to the union, the Board, citing Sylvania II, concluded that
the data were "necessary and important for any further bargaining or
trading on the subject,"42 even though the union had never suggested
that it might wish to make a "Sylvania II decision" affecting its bar-
gaining position on improved insurance benefits as opposed to wage in-
creases. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ordered enforce-
ment of the Board's order,43 citing the classic presumptive relevance
case for in-unit wage data, NLRB v. Whitin Machine Works.
44
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Cone Mills, although not equat-
ing cost information with "wage" data, nevertheless lays down a broad
rule of presumptive relevance based on the reasoning that such in-
formation is relevant to the union's "duty to intelligently evaluate all
employee benefits for which it is negotiating. '45 Moreover, the Board's
reasoning in Cone Mills, fairly interpreted, indicates a presumption of
relevance for premium cost information because the union may want
to make a Sylvania 1I tradeoff of benefits for increased wages. Under
either analysis, one is hard pressed to hypothesize a situation in which
cost information would not be relevant; therefore, it would seem that
41 169 N.L.R.B. 449 (1968), enforced in relevant part, 413 F.2d 445 (4th Cir. 1969).
42 169 N.L.R.B. at 456.
43 Cone Mills Corp. v. NLRB, 413 F.2d 445 (4th Cir. 1969).
44 217 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 849 U.S. 905 (1955). The Cone Mills
court reasoned:
The Union, in its representative capacity, has an affirmative duty to intelli-
gently evaluate all employee benefits for which it is negotiating. Consequently, it
is an unfair labor practice within the meaning of the Act for an employer to
refuse to furnish such information as is necessary to the proper discharge of this
duty.
413 F.2d at 449.
45 413 F.2d at 449.
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data as to premium costs should and will be viewed as presumptively
revelant, although such data are not considered "wage" information.
4
Attempts to apply the presumption of revelance to data as being
directly related to wages (the thrust of the Board's position in Sylvania
1) might be called a derivative presumptive relevance rule. Although
the Board retreated from this approach in the premium cost cases, this
derivative approach has been given vitality in at least one subsequent
case. In International Telephone & Telegraph Corp.,47 the union al-
leged that the company had bargained in bad faith by refusing to
supply, among other things, the factors used in recommending merit
increases for unit employees. The collective bargaining agreement
provided that the sum of such increases was divided into two parts.
One part, representing two-thirds of the total, was computed upon the
basis of company recommendations as to recipients and the amount
each was to receive. Discussions relating to these recommendations
between the company and the union were mandatory, and if the
parties could not agree, the company had the right to put its proposals
into effect unilaterally. Concerning the remaining one-third, a board
composed of both union and company representatives was to review
recommendations made by the union. Unresolved disputes centering
on computation of this portion were to be submitted to arbitration.
The Board ordered the company to provide data showing the factors
used by the employer in recommending merit increases. The Board did
not suggest that the requested data were presumptively relevant; rather
it found that since the union had a responsibility to recommend re-
cipients, to review employer recommendations, and possibly to arbi-
trate disputes arising out of the merit increase provisions of the
contract, the union needed the requested data to fulfill specific con-
tractual administrative responsibilities.
48
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit enforced the merit
increase data portion of the Board's decision,49 but grounded its deci-
sion on a presumptive relevance analysis:
46 The history of the development of the law regarding premium cost data illustrates
the important contribution a circuit court decision can make in the decisional process
of the Board. Had the First Circuit in Sylvania I enforced the Board order, the presumptive
relevance rules would have been extended through the traditional rhetoric of in-unit
wage data invoked in Whitin and its progeny. But faced with the rejection of this
expanded definition of wage data by the First Circuit in Sylvania 1, the Board was
forced to re-evaluate the presumptive relevance concepts outside wage data situations and
develop another rationale for finding that premium cost data is necessary and relevant.
47 159 N.L.R.B. 1757 (1966), enforced in relevant part, 382 F.2d 866 (3d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1039 (1968).
48 159 N.L.R.B. at 1765.
49 International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. NLRB, 382 F.2d 366, 372-73 (3d Cir. 1967).
[Vol. 58:23
DUTY TO SUPPLY INFORMATION
Since merit payments are in fact "wages," information relating
to such payments is "presumptively relevant."... The union, under
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, had the right to
discuss the recommendations of the petitioner in an effort to in-
fluence the petitioner's judgment. We do not see how this preroga-
tive could be exercised effectively without knowing the basis of
the petitioner's suggestions.50
The court's reasoning in International Telephone that both merit
payments, which are concededly wages, and matters "relating to such
payments" are presumptively relevant is substantially the same as that
of the Board in Sylvania I. In both cases the presumptive right to in-
formation is keyed to the direct relationship of the data to in-unit
wages.5
1
2. Developments in the Area of Employee Address Information
Whether a union has a presumptive right to the addresses of unit
members, or whether the union must establish that this information is
specifically necessary to its administration of the contract, is an un-
settled issue. However, there are indications that a rule of presumptive
relevance is emerging.
One of the first decisions by the Board indicating that employee
address information should be so viewed was Standard Oil Co. of Cali-
fornia, Western Operations, Inc.52 There, although the Board found
specific necessity for the requested information based on the inadequacy
of other means of communicating with unit employees, the Board's
rationale may lead one to conclude that employee address information
is so inherently related to the efficacy of the bargaining process that it
should be treated as presumptively relevant. The Board in Standard
Oil noted that information is presumptively relevant when it has a
"direct bearing on the negotiation of wages and fringe benefits or the
bargaining representative's ability to administer the agreement."53 Al-
GO Id. at 372 (citation omitted).
51 The language quoted following the court's discussion of presumptive relevance is
somewhat troublesome. If the court intended that the right to the requested data should
be evaluated as in-unit wage data, then even if the union had no right to participate in
the selection of merit increase recipients, the union would have a presumptive right to ihe
requested data since it has a presumptive right to any "wage" data. Whether the court mis-
understood the legal significance of "presumptive relevance" as developed by the Board
or whether it was attempting to buttress its holding by finding that the information was
not only presumptively relevant but also specifically necessary is unclear. In either event,
it appears that by finding presumptive relevance based on the close relation of the
requested data to wages, the court extended the presumptive relevance principles beyond
the traditional limitation of "wage" data.
52 166 N.L.R.B. 343 (1967), enforced, 399 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1968).
53 166 N.L.R.B. at 345 (footnote omitted).
19721
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
though not specifically treating the requested employee address infor-
mation as presumptively relevant, the Board ordered the employer to
provide the information to the union because the information "would
enable" the union to function more efficiently by enabling it to poll
(1) employee preferences and priorities in contract negotiations, (2)
employee experiences and recommendations with respect to the griev-
ance-arbitration machinery, and (3) employee decisions on the pru-
dence of striking over a particular issue.54 Since these are benefits that
always will result from access to employee addresses and since the ability
to poll unit members on these matters always will enable the union to
represent more effectively the unit members, employee addresses
always will have the "direct bearing" that gives rise to a presumption
of relevance.
The implications of nonaccess to employee address information
also suggest that address information be viewed as presumptively rele-
vant. Without such information, the bargaining representative is un-
able adequately to poll the unit employees, solicit their opinions, or
ascertain their desires. Although handbills and bulletin boards argu-
able adequately to poll the unit employees, solicit their 'opinions, or
termine employee sentiment. Similarly, union meetings may be ade-
quate vehicles to solicit the views of the union members in the unit,
but meetings are frequently not well attended, and the union owes a
duty of fair representation to all unit employees, not just to those who
are union members.55 Further, during the processing of grievances and
preparations for arbitration the union will often find it necessary to
interview thoroughly both members and nonmembers. Such interviews
can be time consuming, particularly since one who has chosen not to
join the union may be unwilling to communicate freely with union rep-
resentatives on company premises in an unhurried manner. Hence, the
union cannot efficiently and effectively negotiate or administer the con-
tract without employee addresses, and nonaccess thereto certainly has
a "direct [adverse] bearing on the negotiation of wages and fringe bene-
fits or the bargaining representative's ability to administer the agree-
ment." 56
Accordingly, it may be concluded that the rationale underlying
the Board's decision in Standard Oil, though admittedly not its holding,
suggests that the presumption of relevance should be accorded to re-
quests for employee address information and that the union should
be entitled to this information without regard to the degree of difficulty
which it experiences in its efforts to communicate with employees.
54 Id.
5 Id.; see Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
56 166 N.L.R.B. at 45 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 58:23
DUTY TO SUPPLY INFORMATION
Additional support for the proposition that such information is
inherently related to the bargaining process can be derived from the
opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Prudential
Insurance Co. of America v. NLRB. 57 Finding inadequate the alterna-
tive channels of communication, as the Board had in Standard Oil, the
court held that the requested address information was necessary to
enable the union adequately to represent unit employees. The court
commented that certain information is "so central to the 'core of the
employer-employee relationship' that it has been held to be presump-
tively relevant" 58 and added that employee address information is to be
considered even more fundamental than other types of information
traditionally falling within the doctrine.59 The soundness of the Second
Circuit's conclusion might well be tested by re-examining the basis for
according presumptive relevance to certain categories of requested in-
formation. Urging the adoption of a presumptive relevance rule for in-
unit wage data, Chairman Farmer in his concurring opinion in Whitin
Machine Works6" concluded:
I am convinced, after careful consideration of the import of the
problem on the collective-bargaining process, that this broad rule
is necessary to avoid the disruptive effect of the endless bickering
and jockeying which has theretofore been characteristic of union
demands and employer reaction to requests by unions for wage
and related information. The unusually large number of cases
coming before the Board involving this issue demonstrates the dis-
turbing effect upon collective bargaining of the disagreements
which arise as to whether particular wage information sought by
the bargaining agent is sufficiently relevant to particular bargain-
ing issues. 1
To require a demonstration that the alternative channels of com-
munication are inadequate to enable the union to communicate with
unit employees in every case involving address information is to invite
57 412 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1969).
58 Id. at 84, quoting Curtiss-Wright Corp., Wright Aeronautical Div. v. NLRB, 347
F.2d 61, 69 (3d Cir. 1965).
59 The kind of information requested by the Union in this case has an even more
fundamental relevance than that considered presumptively relevant. The latter is
needed by the union in order to bargain intelligently on specific issues of concern
to the employees. But data without which a union cannot even communicate with
employees whom it represents is, by its very nature, fundamental to the entire
expanse of a union's relationship with the employees. In this instance it is urgent
so that the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees may perform its
broad range of statutory duties in a truly representative fashion and in harmony
with the employees' desires and interests. Because this information is therefore so
basically related to the proper performance of the union's statutory duties, we
believe any special showing of specific relevance would be superfluous.
412 F.2d at 84.
60 108 N.L.R.B. 1537 (1954).
61 Id. at 1541 (concurring opinion).
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to the bargaining table "endless bickering and jockeying." The Board
in Standard Oil reasoned that "[t]he Union's effectiveness as an em-
ployee representative [is] necessarily dependent on its bargaining
strength, and this in turn [is] dependent on continued employee ad-
herence and support."62 A rule that promotes "endless bickering and
jockeying" and delays access to employee addresses weakens the union's
bargaining strength, erodes the union's effectiveness as a full participant
in the bargaining process, and creates the type of "disturbing effect
upon collective bargaining" that the presumptive relevance rules have
sought to avoid.
The rationale of the Board in Standard Oil, read together with the
opinion of the Second Circuit in Prudential Insurance, establishes a
foundation for the proposition that requests for employee addresses
should be treated as presumptively relevant. Furthermore, extension of
coverage to employee addresses would be consistent with the under-
lying rationale of the presumptive relevance concept. It was the Second
Circuit's dictum in Yawman & Erbe upon which the Board subsequently
relied in the initial development of the presumptive relevance rule.
Perhaps the Board will again look to Second Circuit dictum, this time
in Prudental Insurance, to expand the application of presumptive rele-
vance to employee address information.64
C. Critique of the Presumptive Relevance Concept
Precisely what is meant by the legal conclusion that requested
data is "presumptively relevant"? The answer to this question requires
an understanding of why information in the possession of the employer
must be made available to the union and not treated merely as a man-
datory bargaining subject that must be negotiated to good faith im-
passe.65
In Whitin Machine Works,66 the Board stated:
62 166 N.L.R.B. at 346.
63 See notes 6 & 7 and accompanying text supra.
64 But see Shell Oil Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1972), where the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that there is not a per se duty to supply requested information once it has been
shown to be relevant. Although the union's need for the names and addresses was not
seriously disputed, the court concluded that the company's refusal to provide the informa-
tion did not violate the Act under the special facts of the case. The company had established
a bona fide concern that disclosure of the information would result in union harassment
of nonunion employees and the company had offered a reasonable counterproposal-
furnishing the information to an independent mailing service. See also Sign & Pictorial
Local 1175 v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
65 See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
66 108 N.L.R.B. 1537 (1954).
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[T]he authority conferred by Section 9(a) of the Act upon a union
representing a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit
entitles the union to all [essential] wage information . .. and .... it
is the employer's duty, on request, to accommodate the union....
Refusal by an employer to supply necessary information makes
impossible the full development of the collective-bargaining nego-
tiations which the Act is intended to achieve. It therefore consti-
tutes a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.... [I]n these [wage
data] cases it is sufficient that the information sought by the Union
is related to the issues involved in collective bargaining, and...
no specific need as to a particular issue must be shown.
67
Subsequently, in F.W. Woolworth Co.,68 which involved the right to
wage data in connection with the administration of the contract rather
than during its negotiation, the Board concluded: "The employer's
duty, in either instance, is predicated upon the need of the union for
such information in order to provide intelligent representation of the
employees." 9
The limits on the right to information and the correlative duty to
supply it have not been fully delineated but, as was explained by the
trial examiner in American Oil Co. 70 entitlement to information must
be based on more than mere "relevance" in the abstract.71 Indeed, the
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co.72 ordered the em-
ployer to supply the union with requested data on the basis that the
data were necessary to enable the union to sift out unmeritorious griev-
ances and to determine which should be processed to arbitration.7
In Curtiss-Wright Corp., Wright Aeronautical Division v. NLRB 74
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit wrestled with the dichotomy
between the "necessity" rationale underlying the information cases and
the "relevance" rhetoric invoked. In that case, the union, which repre-
sented only some of the employees (the remainder being nonunion
confidential and administrative employees), sought wage and related
67 Id. at 1538-39 (footnote omitted).
68 109 N.L.R.B. 196 (1954), enforcement denied, 235 F.2d 319 (9th Cir.), rev'd per
curiam, 352 US. 938 (1956).
69 109 N.L.R.B. at 197 (emphasis added).
70 164 N.L.R.B. 29 (1967).
71 [A]il of the cases considering this issue, either in their facts or their rationale,
indicate, as the Board stated in Woolworth, that the right to the information
arises out of a "need" for it shown by the circumstances of the particular situation.
While it is often stated that the information sought must be "relevant," more
than abstract relevance is required. The fact that the information will be merely
"helpful" is not enough.
Id. at 33.
72 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
73 See notes 15-20 and accompanying text supra.
'74 347 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1965), enforcing 145 N.L.R.B. 152 (1963).
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data concerning the nonunit employees. The Board, finding that some
of the requested information would assist the union in fulfilling its
statutory obligations as bargaining representative, ordered that it be
made available.7 5 The court, enforcing the Board's decision, attempted
to unravel the confusion by suggesting that reasonable necessity should
be presumed once it is determined that information is relevant to the
union's statutory obligation. The court agreed with the Board's view
of the general rule regarding employer disclosure of wage and related
information and summarized that rule as follows:
[I]f the requested data [are] relevant and, therefore reasonably nec-
essary, to a union's role as bargaining agent in the administration
of a collective bargaining agreement, it is an unfair labor practice
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act for an employer to
refuse the requested data.76
The court reasoned that if the information sought covers wage and
related information pertaining to employees in the bargaining unit,
the data should be treated as presumptively relevant and the union
should not be required to show its precise relevance unless the pre-
sumption is rebutted. But the court continued:
[A]s to other requested data, however, such as employer profits and
production figures, a union must, by reference to the circumstances
of the case, as an initial matter, demonstrate more precisely the
relevance of the data it desires. Thus, the standard, relevancy of
the data, is the same for all cases, but the manner in which a union
can demonstrate that its requests conform to the standard shift
[sic] with the type of information desired.
Once relevance is determined, an employer's refusal to honor
a request is a per se violation of the Act. Reasonable necessity for
a union to have relevant data is apparent; necessity is not a sepa-
rate and unique guideline, but is directly related to the relevance
of the requested data.77
It thus appears that the reason for the development of the rule
that an employer has an affirmative obligation to provide certain infor-
mation to a union is that the efficiency and effectiveness of collective
bargaining depends upon disclosure by the employer. Need being the
linchpin of the rule, all information demands must be evaluated by
the test of whether the requested information is necessary for the union
to fulfill its statutory obligation as bargaining representative. Certain
types of information will always be needed by any collective bargaining
representative to enable it to perform its functions. Therefore, to pro-
75 145 N.L.R.B. at 152.
78 347 F.2d at 68 (footnote omitted).
77 Id. at 69 (emphasis added).
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mote the peaceful negotiation and administration of contracts and to
avoid interruptions and other deleterious effects that could result from
contests over the reasons the union alleges that the information is neces-
sary, the Board and the courts have raised a rebuttable presumption
that a need exists for certain information. The legal label for the type
of data a union will be found to have a presumptive right to receive is
information that is "presumptively relevant." But this label is seman-
tically misleading. To be precise, it should be termed information that
is "presumptively necessary." Only when "relevant" is read to mean
"necessary" does the case rhetoric comport with the underlying ra-
tionale.
It is submitted that some information other than in-unit wage data
-for example, pension cost data and employee address information78
-should be treated as presumptively relevant, or as we suggest, pre-
sumptively necessary. One should ask not whether information will be
"relevant," but rather, whether the data will be "necessary" to enable
the union to fulfill its statutory obligations. For instance, are not data
to evaluate the fairness of the application of a plant rule or other em-
ployer action necessary to enable the union to decide whether a griev-
ance should be filed, at least where the matter in issue arguably is
subject to the grievance machinery? Even as to "out-of-unit" informa-
tion, should not the union have the right to copies of all subcontracts
involving, or possibly involving, unit work-regardless of the circum-
stances involved or the union's need for such documents with respect
to a particular dispute? Why is such information not presumptively
necessary to enable a union to evaluate whether the integrity of the
bargaining unit is being eroded by employer action?7 9 Guarding against
such erosion is surely a statutory obligation of the bargaining agent.
Collective bargaining has been and will continue to be interrupted
during both negotiations and the administration of the contract by
disputes as to whether requested information is necessary. A broaden-
ing of the presumptive need rules would greatly facilitate collective
bargaining. An understanding of the reason for the rule will enable a
78 See notes 52-64 and accompanying text supra.
79 Under current Board and court decisions, information concerning out-of-unit mat-
ters is not presumptively relevant. The union must therefore demonstrate in each case the
need for the requested data with respect to a particular dispute. See, e.g., American Oil Co.,
164 N.L.R.B. 29, 34 (1967); International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 159 N.L.R.B. 1757, 1759 (1966),
enforcement denied in part, 382 F.2d 366 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1039 (1968);
Curtiss-Wright Corp., Wright Aeronautical Div., 145 N.L.R.B. 152 (1963), enforced, 347
F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1965).
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liberalization without burdening the employer by requiring him to
supply all information which might be merely "relevant" or "helpful."
80
II
SUBSTANTIATION AS A BASIS FOR ORDERING THE
PRODUCTION OF INFORMATION
A. Fundamental Principles
In NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing Co.,81 the Supreme Court or-
dered the defendant company to allow the union's certified public ac-
countant to examine the company's books and other financial data,
80 For an indication of at least one court's concern over this possibility, see Curtiss-
Wright Corp., Wright Aeronautical Div. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61, 69 (3d Cir. 1965). See also
Fafnir Bearing Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1582, 1586 (1964) (footnote and citations omitted):
As in other cases where the statutory rights of employees conflict with the property
rights of employers, the doors are not "always open or always dosed." Rather a
balance must be struck between these competing considerations, based on the
"actualities of industrial relations" . . .which will accommodate the rights of
both parties "with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance
of the other" ....
The Board's recent decision in General Elec. Co., 192 N.L.R.B. No. 9, 77 L.R.R.M.
1561 (July 14, 1971), enforced, 81 L.R.R.M. 2303 (6th Cir. Sept. 15, 1972), is a good ex-
ample of the Board's ability to differentiate between what is necessary and what is merely
helpful. The Board ordered the employer to provide the union with an area wage survey
over the company's protest that it had no such duty since it had not relied on the survey
in denying recent wage rate grievances. The Board held that even if respondent "did
not specifically rely on the wage surveys in regard to individual grievances, its reliance
was inherent in setting the wage rates and in considering the grievances as a group with
respect to their overall wage structure" (77 L.R.R.M. at 1562)-a reasonable inference from
the company spokesman's testimony that, during the grievance meeting, "we looked
at the grievances, we considered them as a group and our rate structure was proper."
Id. (emphasis in original). The Board reasoned that by stating that the wage rates
were "proper" the company could only mean "proper" in relation to the wage
structure in the company's geographic area. Thus the company must have taken
into consideration the area wage survey. Id. Chairman Miller, dissenting, contended that
the majority erred either as to the facts in finding that the company relied on the area
wage survey or as to the law in misapplying presumptive relevance concepts to out-of-unit
information. In either event, Miller concluded, the majority opinion "appears to hold that
any such information which could have relevance to shaping either party's decision with
respect to any matter at issue or to be negotiated must be revealed to the other party upon
request." Id. at 1566 (emphasis in original). Contrary to the chairman's assertion, the
majority emphasized that it was not holding that any information which might have
relevance must be disclosed, but rather that its decision rested on its conclusion "that there
was inherent reliance by the Company upon the wage surveys in its possession as evidenced
by the Company's testimony that wage surveys are used . . . to determine if [the Com-
pany's] wage structure is proper and effective for the purpose of attracting and retaining
employees." Id. at 1562.
81 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
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over the objection of the company that the requested information was
irrelevant to bargaining. The Court noted that the company had
claimed throughout negotiations concerning a wage increase for unit
employees that it was undercapitalized, that it had never paid dividends,
and that a wage increase would put it out of business. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court held that the company's refusal to substantiate its claim
of inability to pay constituted, under the circumstances, bad faith bar-
gaining violative of section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 2 The holding of the
Court was premised upon section 204(a)(1) of the Act,83 which requires
employers, employees, and unions to "exert every reasonable effort to
make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, hours, and
working conditions."8 14 The Court reasoned:
Good-faith bargaining necessarily requires that claims made
by either bargainer should be honest claims. This is true about an
asserted inability to pay an increase in wages. If such an argument
is important enough to present in the give and take of bargaining,
it is important enough to require some sort of proof of its accuracy.
And it would certainly not be farfetched for a trier of fact to reach
the conclusion that bargaining lacks good faith when an employer
mechanically repeats a claim of inability to pay without making
the slightest effort to substantiate the claim.88
Truitt is generally regarded as the landmark information decision
even though it does not strictly fall within the "information" line of
cases. The classic information cases are based on the reasoning that
certain information is deemed necessary to enable the union to fulfill
its section 9(a) bargaining obligations; hence, the employer has an
affirmative obligation to supply the requested information. 8 However,
in Truitt, the Supreme Court neither referred to section 9(a) nor relied
on any of the "necessary and relevant" information cases. Thus Truitt
might be better viewed as establishing an entirely separate basis for
finding an obligation to supply requested information-the good faith
duty to substantiate bargaining claims. Good faith, the Supreme Court
reasoned, may require the employer to substantiate a position taken
during bargaining. Since the duty to substantiate is not dependent
upon a prior showing of necessity, the obligation to produce sufficient
economic data to support a bargaining position arises notwithstanding
82 Id. at 153.
83 29 U.S.C. § 174(a)(1) (1970).
84 Id.
85 351 U.S. at 152-53 (emphasis added).
86 See cases cited in note 2 supra.
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that collective bargaining may be able to continue without this in-
formation, that is, even though the requested substantiating informa-
tion may not be "necessary" under the traditional analysis.8 7
B. Application of Substantiation Principles During the Administra-
tion of a Contract
The duty to supply information during the administration stage
of bargaining could be greatly affected by the Truitt substantiation
rule. The Supreme Court in United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co.88 observed that "[t]he grievance procedure is
* . . a part of the continuous collective bargaining process."8 19 This
dearly suggests that a position taken during the processing of a
grievance is a bargaining position, and in at least one case, Puerto Rico
Telephone Co., 0 the Board applied the Truitt rationale to bargaining
positions taken during the administration of the contract. There, the
company in 1958 began a large scale modernization program so ex-
tensive that it unquestionably would entail the subcontracting of
considerable bargaining unit work. After the program had been sub-
stantially completed, the company began to lay off employees, and by
1963, 227 had been let go. The union considered the company's con-
tinued subcontracting of unit work as the reason for the layoffs. The
company disputed this claim, but agreed to submit the dispute to
the grievance committee. The union members of the grievance com-
mittee requested the following data:
(1) volume of business during January, February, and March
1963 compared to that during November 1962 when the
contract was signed;
(2) earnings derived by the company from this volume of business;
(3) amounts saved by the company due to wages not paid to those
laid off;
87 Although the Board's decision in Truitt Mfg. Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 856 (1954), may be
read as presenting a traditional information case of the Whitin variety, the Supreme Court
was careful to limit its holding to a substantiation analysis. The dissenters argued that
the case should be returned to the Board because the Board had applied a per se test in
determining that the employer had violated § 8(a)(5), i.e., that the employer's failure to sup-
ply information constituted a per se refusal to bargain in good faith. 351 U.S. at 157 (Frank-
furter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority, however, chose to up-
hold the Board's finding of a violation after an analysis of the particular facts, but ex-
plained that in substantiation cases not every refusal to substantiate would be a violation
of § 8(a)(5). Id. at 153-54.
88 863 US. 574 (1960).
89 Id. at 581.
90 149 N.L.R.B. 950 (1964), enforced in relevant part, 359 F.2d 983 (1st Cir. 1966).
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(4) whether others were performing the work previously done
by laid-off personnel; and
(5) the overall savings that would accrue to the company.91
The union stated that it desired the requested information to deter-
mine whether the layoffs were due to "economic reorganization," as
claimed by the employer, and to evaluate the employer's allegations
of savings allegedly resulting therefrom. The union made no claim of
"necessity," and the company rejected the union's request.
The Board held that on the issue "whether Respondent (employer)
was duty bound to support its claim that the layoffs were effected
for economy reasons,"92 the employer had violated section 8(a)(5) by
its refusal to comply with the union's request. The Board based its
conclusion on two grounds. Initially, the Board noted that the re-
quested information was "relevant in order to enable the Union to
perform its statutory obligation in administering the bargaining con-
tract" and "to enable the Union to evaluate intelligently the pending
grievance it was then attempting to process."93 But the Board reasoned
further: "Respondent's claimed economy having been advanced as an
'argument... important enough to present in the give and take of
bargaining, it is important enough to require some sort of proof of its
accuracy.' ,,94
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, enforcing the union's
right to the requested information, decided that the information was
relevant to the union's fulfillment of its statutory obligations under
the Act. But the court also held, as had the Board, that the union had
a right to the information because the union "wanted the company to
prove that ... economic reasons existed." 95
Puerto Rico Telephone is significant for two reasons. First, the
Board, with court approval, applied the Truitt substantiation rule to
a case of bargaining during the administration stage. Second, although
9M 149 N.L.R.B. at 958.
92 Id. at 965.
98 Id. at 966. The requested information was found to be "relevant" not only with
respect to the specific grievance the union was attempting to process but also with respect
to the union's statutory obligation to administer the contract, since with the information
the
[u]nion could in future layoffs, as well as in the pending layoff, be "in a better
position to advise an employee about his rights, to reject those employee claims
which are not supported by the facts, and to protect the rights of employees gen-
erally in properly administering the contract."
Id. at 966, quoting Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 746, 753 (6th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 876 U.S. 971 (1964).
94 149 N.L.R.B. at 966, quoting NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 851 US. 149, 152-53 (1956).
95 Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 859 F.2d 983, 986-87 (1st Cir. 1966).
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most substantiation cases arise in the context of an employer's claimed
"inability to pay" 96 or "inability to remain competitive,"97 the Board
in Puerto Rico Telephone relied on a substantiation analysis where
the employer merely claimed its action would be more economical.
The significance of these two aspects of the decision to the develop-
ment of the law on demands for information during contract adminis-
tration is clear. If the Board will apply Truitt principles to contract
administration cases and not limit substantiation to claims of inability
to pay, then the union will have an entirely separate basis for claiming
the right to information which will substantiate an employer's griev-
ance position without demonstrating a specific necessity for the re-
quested data.
An excellent illustration of the potential application of sub-
stantiation as a basis for requiring production of information may be
found in the 1967 Board decision in American Oil Co.°s In that case,
the bargaining agreement provided that the company would make
"every reasonable effort to use its available working force and equip-
ment in order to avoid having its normal work performed outside." 09
Apprehensive that the company was subcontracting unit work in viola-
tion of the contract, the union requested that the company provide it
with copies of all future subcontracts involving unit work. The Board
dismissed a section 8(a)(5) complaint which was based on the employer's
refusal to supply the requested information. Relying upon the general
principles of out-of-unit information cases such as Curtiss-Wright Corp.,
Wright Aeronautical Division v. NLRB, 100 the Board concluded that
since the request for this out-of-unit information was not shown to be
relevant to the circumstances of any particular grievance, specific
necessity had not been established.
96 See, e.g., NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 US. 149 (1956); NLRB v. Southland Cork
Co., 342 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Taylor Foundry Co., 388 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir.
1964). In Palomar Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. No. 98, 78 L.R.R.M. 1030 (Aug. 11, 1971), enforced,
80 L.R.R.M. 3217 (5th Cir. July 25, 1972), the Truitt principle was applied where an
employer claimed financial inability to continue paying the wage rates provided in the
previous collective bargaining contract.
97 In Cincinnati Cordage & Paper Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 72 (1963), the Board noted that
an employer's contention that a wage increase would not permit him to "stay competitive"
was tantamount to a claim that the wage increase would lead to the employer's impoverish-
ment. Id. at 77. No matter how the employer phrased his claim of penury-whether pres-
ent or future-the Board held the principles of Truitt to apply. Id. In Western Wire-
bound Box Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 1539 (1964), enforced, 356 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1966), the Truitt
principle was extended to encompass the claim of "competitive disadvantage."
98 164 N.L.R.B. 29 (1967).
99 Quoted id. at 80.
10D 347 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1965).
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In the American Oil Co. case, the company throughout the con-
troversy had taken the position concerning the alleged subcontracting
of unit work that it was not violating the contract, but the General
Counsel did not raise a "substantiation" argument. Had this argument
been presented, the Board might well have applied the Truitt-Puerto
Rico Telephone rule. The General Counsel could have contended that
the company's claim that it was not subcontracting unit work was an
assertion of a present and continuing bargaining position, since it
would be unreasonable to require shop stewards to begin each working
day by asking management if it intended to subcontract unit work
during that particular day. Management's assertion, viewed in this
light, was a statement that it was not subcontracting and did not intend
to subcontract unit work in violation of the contract. If the case had
been thus analyzed, it is arguable that the substantiation doctrine
would have required the company to substantiate its position by
producing the subcontracts requested.
III
MERGING CONCEPTS OR CoNFusED ANALYSIS?
A serious question exists whether the Truitt decision will ulti-
mately be construed as establishing substantiation as a separate basis for
ordering employers to make information available to unions. Many
Board and court cases, several citing Truitt, consider the union's
request for substantiating evidence as a demand for "necessary" in-
formation.
In Fafnir Bearing Co.,10 1 the Board was faced with a significant
issue in the area of demands for information made during the ad-
ministration stage of a collective bargaining agreement. The company
had furnished the union with all time study data which it had utilized
in setting piece rates1 2 but had denied the union's request to conduct
its own independent time studies at the company's plant. In ordering
the company to comply with the union's request, the Board reasoned
that the employer's time study data were insufficient to enable the
union to judge the accuracy of the piece rate determination. Although
on its facts Fafnir might have been considered a substantiation case
(substantiation of the company's position that its time study had been
101 146 N.L.R.B. 1582 (1964), enforced, 862 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1966).
102 It is, of course, settled that time study information used to determine rates of
compensation constitutes wage data. See, e.g., Otis Elevator Co., 102 NL.R.B. 770, enforced
as modified, 208 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1953).
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properly conducted and the proposed rates accurately computed), the
Board opted for an analysis based upon "necessity" principles. Thus,
the Board reached the conclusion that the independent time study was
"necessary to enable the Union to make an intelligent decision whether
to proceed to arbitration."'
103
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, enforcing the
Board's decision, recognized that the case turned on a question of sub-
stantiation: "The issue confronting us, however, is whether in the
circumstances presented here, the Company in fact was required to
. . . grant permission to the Union to make a live study so that it
could reliably evaluate the company's data."'' 1 4 Notwithstanding this
characterization of the question presented, the court enforced the
Board's decision because it believed the union needed the substantiat-
ing information to evaluate the pending grievances. The court cited
Truitt for the general proposition that an employer is obligated to
supply relevant information, 0 5 but it did not rely on Truitt for the
proposition that apart from the need of the time study in relation to a
specific grievance, the company had a duty to substantiate its position
that the proposed piece rates were fair and that its own time study
accurately reflected the job.
Other time study cases have involved the issue of substantiation
of an employer's piece-rate determination, but the rationale of these
cases does not focus upon the substantiation issue as separate and
distinct from that of necessity. Rather, the Board and the courts tend
to merge or confuse the two. For example, in General Electric Co. 16
the collective bargaining contract provided that the setting of produc-
tion standards was subject to the grievance-arbitration machinery.
The union requested the right to conduct a separate time study,
103 146 N.L.R.B. at 1584.
104 Fafnir Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 362 FR2d 716, 721 (2d Cir. 1966). It should be noted
that the Second Circuit in NLRB v. Otis Elevator Co., 208 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1953), had re-
fused to require the company to allow the union to conduct independent time studies.
In Falnir the court distinguished Otis Elevator on the ground that in the earlier case
the union had not alleged that the employer's data were insufficient to enable the union
to bargain intelligently. In Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg. Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 621 (1968), the
employer was found to have unlawfully refused to permit a union time study even though
the union had neither requested nor received the employer's time study data. Since the
employer's study would not have been "intelligible" to the union unless it had further
knowledge of the variables involved, it would have been "unreasonable" to have required
the union to have first requested to review the employer's study before being permitted
to conduct its own study. Id. at 621-22.
105 362 F.2d at 721.
106 173 N.L.R.B. 164 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 918 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 896
U.S. 1005 (1970).
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claiming it lacked sufficient data to present grievances involving produc-
tion standards effectively. In enforcing the Board's order that the
employer permit the union to make its requested independent time
study, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit cited Fafnir in
support of the relevance-necessity test underlying its own opinion:
"An employer's duty to provide relevant information to union rep-
resentatives so that they can effectively bargain on behalf of their
members has been established beyond question.... Consequently
... we believe the Board, exercising its expertise and special com-
petence, could properly determine that the Union's need to conduct
these tests outweighed the Company's interest in dosing its doors
to outsiders."'107
However, in its conclusion, the Fourth Circuit brought in the sub-
stantiation theme:
The data collected by General Electric was that [sic] which it relied
on, in part, to set hourly rates. General Electric claimed that based
upon this data the employees involved in wage grievances were not
underpaid. Under such circumstances, it was incumbent on General
Electric under § 8(a)(5) of the Act to disclose proof of the accuracy
of its position.108
CONCLUSION
The state of the law regarding the substantiation of bargaining
positions is unclear. Truitt is not based on a section 9(a) obligation,
and Puerto Rico Telephone supports the proposition that the sub-
stantiation requirement is a separate basis for ordering that informa-
tion be made available. Nevertheless, cases such as Fafnir seem to
107 414 F.2d at 922-23, quoting Fafnir Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 862 F.2d 716, 721 (2d Cir.
1966) (emphasis added).
108 414 F.2d at 925 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Waycross Sportswear, Inc. v. NLRB,
403 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1968), the Fifth Circuit, relying in part on Truitt to sustain a Board
finding that the company had unlawfully refused to permit the union to study a plant's
piece-rate operations in connection with wage negotiations, reasoned:
We agree with the Second Circuit's recent decision holding that the refusal
of an employer to allow the Union to make a piece-rate study in connection with
evaluating the merits of a grievance constitute independently a violation of
§ 8(a)(5) ... [citing Fafnir]. If needed during the performance under an existing
contract, such information may be of even more significance in negotiations looking
toward the making of an agreement. The demand here was reasonable and well
supported in need. The refusal by Waycross violated "the duty of the employer
to furnish to the union relevant data to enable the representative effectually to
bargain for the workers."
Id. at 836 (footnote omitted), quoting Sinclair Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 806 F.2d 569, 571 (5th
Cir. 1962). See also NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
597 US. 965 (1970).
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indicate that substantiation will be viewed from the perspective of
what a union needs to administer the contract effectively rather than
what the employer must do to fulfill the statutory duty to bargain in
good faith. The difference is critical. The former analysis requires that
the union establish the necessity for the requested information to
enable it to bargain intelligently. Under the latter position, the union
need only establish that the employer introduced an argument in the
give and take of bargaining; the employer must then provide "some
sort of proof of its accuracy."' 09 Perhaps the principles of substantiation
have been merged into the "necessary and relevant" rationale inten-
tionally, or perhaps the Board and the courts have failed to understand
that Truitt is not a "necessary and relevant" case at all.
In any event, it is submitted that the national labor policy of
encouraging collective bargaining will be enhanced by recognizing
substantiation as a separate basis for requiring the production of in-
formation. Truitt teaches that good faith bargaining requires each
party to rely upon only honest claims. Thus, when a party presents a
claim, the requirement of good faith bargaining should be held to
entail that the claim be substantiated, even in the absence of the show-
ing of a specific need for the information.
109 NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153 (1956).
